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It might seem odd these days to be considering the possibility of carbon taxes as climate 
policy. But there is the distinct possibility that states will address climate change as the federal 
government abandons this policy area. Second, there remains the faint hope that the Trump 
administration or Congress will recognize carbon taxation as a vehicle for tax reform. Many, 
many policy experts, economists, and environmentalists have long been arguing that carbon 
taxation is the least costly and most efective way to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. But less 
commonly discussed is the fact that carbon taxation ofers the opportunity to address a number 
of non-environmental objectives, such as iscal reform, infrastructure funding, or reducing 
inequality.
A carbon tax is a unitary tax on actual carbon dioxide emissions. Carbon taxes can be levied 
upstream, at the point of extraction, reining (of oil), or distribution, or downstream, at the 
gasoline pump or as an addition to an electricity or heating bill. A carbon tax can be expanded 
to include other greenhouse gases, as long as the tax on emissions of these other greenhouse 
gases is calibrated depending on those gases’ warming potential, using carbon dioxide as an 
index. In practice, carbon taxes are limited to consumption of reined gasoline, fossil fuel-
generated electricity, and household and industrial uses of common natural gas and heating oil. 
Such a simple carbon tax generally covers the vast majority of carbon dioxide emissions.
A carbon tax is efective in reducing emissions and is also economically eicient. Carbon taxes 
can be applied very broadly and simply, as the tracking and taxation of fossil fuels is already 
quite routine. Because a carbon tax would build on existing regulatory infrastructure, the 
certainty that it will succeed in reducing emissions instead of bogging down in litigation is very 
high. Moreover, a carbon tax scales proportionately with the amount of emissions, so that it 
takes account of the diferent contributions that diferent fossil fuels make to climate change. 
Burning coal, which produces roughly twice the carbon dioxide emissions as burning natural 
gas, would be subject to twice the tax. hat is how environmental law should work: the impetus 
to curtail an activity should be weighted by its environmental harm. As a side beneit, reducing 
emissions from coal extraction, transport, and combustion would also generate a number of 
health beneits unrelated to climate change, such as a reduction in respiratory diseases and 
deaths from cardio-pulmonary diseases. A carbon tax is not the only climate policy that would 
reap those health beneits, but it best internalizes these social costs to the emitter.
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Breadth of application and accurate scaling also ensure that carbon taxation reduces emissions 
at the lowest cost. A carbon tax ripples across the entire economy, and up and down production 
chains, so that it is an accurate measure—and price—for a total end-product carbon footprint. 
As such, it will broadly recruit eforts to ind eiciencies and reduce emissions, with the 
most attention being paid to where reductions are the greatest and cheapest. Critically, 
carbon taxation is agnostic as to speciic strategies or technologies; there is no favoritism 
for a technology that will support the economy of an important swing state. What many 
other climate policies do—which makes them irresistible to politicians—is pick winners and 
losers. A carbon tax is the way to have markets, not politicians, determine which strategies or 
technologies best reduce emissions, and at the lowest possible cost.
On the rare occasions in which carbon taxation has been proposed, it has withstood withering 
assaults based on misleading assertions from the fossil fuel industry and its allies. Somewhat 
surprisingly, objections have also come from the political let, and not without reason. By itself, 
carbon taxation is regressive, hurting poor households more than wealthy ones. While wealthy 
households generally consume more energy and have a larger absolute carbon “footprint,” 
energy expenses occupy a larger share of a poor household’s budget and are thus more painful 
for the latter.
Climate change deniers and the fossil fuel industries, sowing discontent among the poor, 
would have you stop your analysis there. But to do that is to speciously assume that carbon 
tax revenues would be gathered together in a pile of bills and burned. A federal carbon tax of, 
say $40 per ton of carbon dioxide, would produce irst-year revenues of at least $200 billion, 
which could go a long way towards reducing the inancial impact to lower-income households, 
reducing distortionary taxes, such as corporate or personal income taxes, and even providing 
relief to industries and communities sufering disproportionately from the decline of fossil fuel 
use. If lawmakers wish to protect the lowest-earning 60 percent of households from carbon 
taxation, less than half of the proceeds would be needed to insulate them from any net loss. A 
carbon tax “rebate” could be in the form of a lump sum distribution or any number of other tax 
credits targeted towards lower income taxpayers. here would still be money let over for other 
priorities.
Fiscal beneits could make carbon taxation an especially attractive option at the state level. 
Washington State, for example, spurred by a failed but surprisingly popular carbon tax ballot 
initiative, has proposed a carbon tax that would provide funding for its chronically under-
funded public schools. Other cash-strapped states might decide that a 40-cent-per gallon gas 
price increase (the product of a $40 per ton carbon tax) might not anger motorists quite as 
much as continuing cuts to social services, education, or road maintenance. At levels currently 
discussed, a carbon tax is a relatively low but very broad tax, raising large amounts of revenue 
in small amounts, and minimizing economic disruption. For those people or industries that are 
disproportionately impacted, the revenues are generally large enough to provide meaningful 
compensation.
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A carbon tax is unappealing, just because it is a tax. But lawmakers would do well to heed 
the call of Republican statesmen James Baker III and George P. Schultz, as well as prominent 
conservative economists Martin Feldstein and Gregory Mankiw, all of whom have recently 
called for a carbon tax. Once lawmakers accept that there are no free lunches, the simplest 
solution will reveal itself to be the best solution.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
